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ABSTRACT 
In 1986, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”) to provide additional protections for individuals’ private 
communications content held in electronic storage by third parties.  
Acting out of direct concern for the implications of the Third-Party 
Records Doctrine—a judicially created doctrine that generally 
eliminates Fourth Amendment protections for information 
entrusted to third parties—Congress sought to tailor the SCA to 
electronic communications sent via and stored by third parties. Yet, 
because Congress crafted the SCA with language specific to the 
technology of 1986, courts today have struggled to apply the SCA 
consistently with regard to similar private content sent using 
different technologies.   
This Article argues that Congress should revisit the SCA and 
adopt a single, technology-neutral standard of protection for 
private communications content held by third-party service 
providers.  Furthermore, it suggests that Congress specifically 
intended to limit the scope of the Third-Party Records Doctrine by 
creating greater protections via the SCA, and thus courts 
interpreting existing law should afford protection to new 
technologies such as social media communications consistent with 
that intent based on individuals’ expressed privacy preferences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, social networking platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Google+ have exploded in popularity, 
fundamentally changing the way individuals and organizations 
communicate.  Facebook, the world’s largest social networking platform, 
currently claims more than one billion monthly active users.
1
  Twitter 
recently surpassed the 200 million monthly active user mark,
2
 while 
LinkedIn and Google+ claim more than 160 and 135 million monthly active 
                                                     
1
 Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Nov. 
18, 2014). 
2
 Darrell Etherington, Twitter Passes 200M Monthly Active Users, TECHCRUNCH 
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/12/18/twitter-passes-200m-monthly-
active-users-a-42-increase-over-9-months/. 
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users, respectively.
3
  As these companies continue to develop the 
functionality and expand the reach of their social networking platforms, so 
too will users continue to increase their reliance on social media for an even 
wider range of communication needs.  And because these platforms provide 
varying communication channels—from wall posts and tweets to direct 
messages and private chats—users will eventually and necessarily foster 
varying expectations of privacy with regard to each communication 
channel. 
Yet for a variety of legal and practical reasons, it remains unclear 
whether Fourth Amendment protections extend to communications shared 
and stored online.  Although Congress sought to remedy this uncertainty in 
1986 by enacting the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),4 courts have 
embraced varying and often contradictory interpretations of the Act’s 
language, especially when applying the statute to modern technology that 
did not exist at the time of its enactment.
5
  As a result, seemingly private 
electronic communications, such as e-mails stored on Gmail or private 
messages saved on Facebook, may not receive full privacy protection under 
the SCA, whereas semi-public wall posts could potentially trigger the Act’s 
highest protections.
6
  In all cases, however, since these electronic 
communications are “records” entrusted to “third parties” by individuals, 
but for the SCA they would enjoy no Fourth Amendment protection due to 
the Third-Party Records Doctrine (“TPRD”).7 
Recent events suggesting expansive federal surveillance operations 
based on the acquisition of information from these third-party providers 
further highlight the importance of addressing the role of Fourth 
Amendment protections for online communications.  The protections in the 
                                                     
3
 Salvador Rodriguez, LinkedIn Had 160 Million Active Users, Up 20% in Two 
Months, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2013/jan/14/business/la-fi-tn-linkedin-160-million-members-20130114; Amir 
Errata, Google+ Announces 135 Million Users, Debuts Instagram Competitor, 
WALL ST. J. TECH. BLOG (Dec. 6. 2012, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
digits/2012/12/06/google-announces-135-million-users-debuts-instagram-
competitor/. 
4
 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555; see infra 
pp. 5–7.  
5
 Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1211–12 (2004). 
6
 For further discussion of statutory protections afforded to private messages and 
wall posts, see infra Part II.B.1–2.   
7
 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443–44 (1976) (holding that an 
individual does not have a Fourth Amendment interest in bank records released to a 
third party); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that 
the installation and use of a pen register device does not constitute a search under 
the Fourth Amendment). 
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SCA are critical in an age where Gmail, Facebook, and Skype have nearly 
replaced the use of the Postal Service and telephone system for regular 
communication.  Furthermore, this shift in technology and the resulting 
ambiguity of protection under the SCA demonstrate the shortcomings of the 
TPRD and suggest that Congress sought to limit the scope of this doctrine 
to certain contexts such as personal correspondence. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I provides a brief 
contextual background of the SCA and its interaction with the TPRD.  It 
summarizes the SCA’s legislative history, provides an overview of the 
statute’s key components, and lays a foundation suggesting Congress’s 
intent to provide privacy protections limiting the scope of the TPRD.  Part 
II examines the current split between the traditional interpretation of the 
SCA—as promulgated by the Department of Justice and most recently 
embraced by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Jennings v. 
Jennings—and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation as to whether opened e-
mails are held in “electronic storage” as defined by the Act.  It then 
proceeds to address the SCA’s application in the context of social media 
and examines empirical data relating to the efficacy of social networking 
platforms’ privacy settings.  Part III suggests Congress amend the SCA in 
order to return the Act to its original intent: providing universal privacy 
protections for private electronic communications regardless of whether 
those communications are in transit or in storage.  This Article further 
recommends Congress adopt technology-neutral statutory language, which 
has enduring as opposed to temporary efficacy, to protect more effectively 
communications content now and in the future.  It suggests language to help 
effect this goal and also provides suggestions for how courts should act in 
the interim to preserve the additional protections Congress created with the 
SCA, which are directly responsive to the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
the TPRD. 
I. A BRIEF CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE SCA 
The SCA is a federal statute that governs the privacy of stored 
Internet communications.
8
  Congress enacted the SCA in 1986 to provide a 
set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections for communications 
made online because it was, and still remains, largely unclear whether 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections extend to the online context.
9
  
Professor Orin Kerr suggests three reasons why the constitutional 
                                                     
8
 Kerr, supra note 5, at 1208. Some states have statutes analogous to the federal 
SCA, including Texas, Florida, and Minnesota.  See Fernando M. Pinguelo & 
Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real Damages: A Primer On Cybercrimes In 
The United States and Efforts to Combat Cybercriminals, 16 VA. J. L. & TECH. 
116, 150-188 (2011) (setting forth a multi-state survey of cyber-related statutes). 
9
 Id. at 1210–11. 
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protections against unreasonable searches and seizures may not reach the 
virtual world.  First, Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence has created 
“uncertainty over whether and when Internet users can retain a ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ in information sent to network providers, including 
e-mails.”10  In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court established the 
third-party doctrine, which denies Fourth Amendment protections to 
information disclosed to an entity not originally party to the 
communication.
11
  Because virtually all Internet communications are shared 
with a network service provider, i.e., a third party, users may be 
categorically prohibited from enjoying a reasonable expectation of privacy 
online.  Second, Fourth Amendment rules governing grand jury subpoenas 
suggest that the government may subpoena online communications held by 
third-party network service providers without first obtaining a warrant 
based on probable cause.
12
  Third, most providers are private actors and 
may therefore disclose stored communications without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.
13
 
A. Legislative History of the SCA  
 In October 1985, the Office of Technology Assessment issued a 
report entitled “Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties,” which 
concluded that “current legal protections for electronic mail are weak, 
ambiguous, or non-existent,” and that “electronic mail remains legally as 
well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized surveillance.”14  One year 
later, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”), and with it 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, or the SCA, “to update and 
clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic 
changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies.”15  The 
Senate Report on the SCA highlights Congress’s desire to extend to 
electronic communications the underlying privacy protections already 
afforded to postal mail and private telephone conversations: 
A letter sent by first class mail is afforded a high level of protection 
against unauthorized opening by a combination of constitutional 
provisions, case law, and U.S. Postal Service statutes and regulations.  
Voice communications transmitted via common carrier are protected 
by title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968. 
                                                     
10
 Id. at 1210. 
11
 Miller, 425 U.S at 443.  
12
 Kerr, supra note 5, at 1212. 
13
 Id. 
14
 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3358. 
15
 Id. at 1. 
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But there are no comparable Federal statutory standards to protect the 
privacy and security of communications transmitted by new 
noncommon carrier communications services or new forms of 
telecommunications and computer technology.  This is so, even though 
American citizens and American businesses are using these new forms 
of technology in lieu of, or side-by-side with, first class mail and 
common carrier telephone services.
16
 
In passing ECPA, Congress sought to promote technological 
innovation, encourage the commercial use of “innovative communications 
systems,” discourage unauthorized users from obtaining access to 
communications to which they are not a party, and establish clearer 
standards to protect both law enforcement officials from liability and the 
admissibility of legitimately obtained evidence.
17
  Congress explicitly 
sought to achieve a “fair balance between the privacy expectations of 
American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies.”18 
The Senate Report on the SCA plainly indicates Congress’s intent 
to protect certain information stored electronically in the same manner as 
information stored locally: “With the advent of computerized recordkeeping 
systems, Americans have lost the ability to lock away a great deal of 
personal and business information . . . .  For the person or business whose 
records are involved, the privacy or proprietary interest in that information 
should not change.”19  This sentiment is repeated throughout the report: 
“Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it will 
gradually erode as technology advances.  Congress must act to protect the 
privacy of our citizens.  If we do not, we will promote the gradual erosion 
of this precious right.”20  The SCA’s fundamental parts reflect Congress’s 
dueling priorities of promoting technological innovation while securing 
reasonable expectations of privacy, as the next section explains. 
B. Key Components of the SCA 
The SCA affords privacy protections to online communications 
held by two types of Internet service providers (“ISPs”): providers of 
electronic communication services (“ECS”) and providers of remote 
computing services (“RCS”).21  The SCA defines ECS as “any service 
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or 
                                                     
16
 Id. at 5. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. at 3. 
20
Id. at 5.  For a more detailed discussion of how these sentiments demonstrate 
Congress’s intent to establish additional protections under law designed to limit the 
scope of the TPRD, see Part I.C. 
21
 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
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electronic communications.”22  By way of example, Google or Yahoo! acts 
as an ECS provider when a user employs the Gmail or Yahoo! Mail service 
to send or receive an e-mail.
23
  The SCA defines RCS as “the provision to 
the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an 
electronic communications system.”24  For example, Amazon acts as an 
RCS provider when a user employs Amazon Cloud Drive to store data 
remotely for long-term safekeeping. 
In determining whether the SCA covers an ISP, the first inquiry is 
whether the ISP storing the communication is acting as a provider of ECS 
or RCS with regard to that communication.
25
  If the ISP is acting as neither, 
then the SCA does not apply to the communication at issue.
26
  These 
classifications necessarily depend on the context of the implicated 
communications: “the key is the provider’s role with respect to a particular 
copy of a particular communication, rather than the provider’s status in the 
abstract.”27  Importantly, ISPs can (and often do) function as both ECS and 
RCS providers.
28
 
The SCA categorizes online information into content and non-
content information and affords different standards of protection to each.
29
  
Content information generally consists of the user’s actual communications, 
whereas non-content information generally includes records and other 
information pertaining to the user.
30
  The SCA prohibits ECS providers 
from voluntarily divulging content information held in electronic storage to 
third parties.
31
  It also prohibits RCS providers from voluntarily divulging 
content information to third parties, but only when the RCS provider 
maintains the information “solely for the purpose of providing storage or 
computer processing services to [the] subscriber or customer.”32  The SCA 
is more permissive respecting voluntary disclosure to government entities, 
and prohibits only disclosure of non-content information by both ECS and 
                                                     
22
 Id. § 2510(15). 
23
 See Kerr, supra note 5, at 1216 (explaining distinctions between providers of 
electronic communication services and providers of remote computing services); 
see also Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the statutory definition of an ECS provider includes basic e-mail services). 
24
 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). 
25
 Kerr, supra note 5, at 1213. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. at 1215. 
28
 Id.  
29
 Simon M. Baker, Unfriending the Stored Communications Act: How 
Technological Advancement and Legislative Inaction Have Rendered Its 
Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 88 (2011). 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. at 89. 
32
 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
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RCS providers.
33
  Furthermore, these provisions apply only when the ISP is 
providing a service to the public.
34
  This latter inquiry is fairly 
straightforward: an entity is providing a service to the public if it provides 
that service to “the community at large,” irrespective of whether it charges a 
fee.
35
  Most university and government e-mail accounts are non-public 
providers and therefore are not covered by the SCA.
36
 
While § 2702 regulates voluntary disclosure of content and non-
content information, § 2703 regulates the processes by which government 
entities may compel network service providers to release electronically 
stored information.  The government may compel the disclosure of content 
information from an RCS provider in three ways.
37
  First, the government 
may require disclosure without providing notice to the subscriber or 
customer “if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the 
case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”38  The second and third means of compelling 
disclosure of content information from RCS providers require the 
government to provide notice to the subscriber or customer.
39
  After 
satisfying the prior-notice requirement, the government may obtain either 
“an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or 
grand jury trial,” or “a court order for such disclosure under § 2703(d).”40 
For ECS providers, the government must adhere to certain timetable 
requirements for compelling disclosure.  If the content information is held 
in electronic storage for 180 days or fewer, the government must obtain a 
warrant to compel disclosure.
41
  If the content information is held in 
electronic storage for more than 180 days, the government may compel 
disclosure after providing prior notice and obtaining either an administrative 
subpoena or a court order.
42
 
For the communication at issue to be covered by the rules 
governing ECS, it must be held in “electronic storage,” as that term is 
defined in the statute.
43
  The SCA provides two definitions of electronic 
                                                     
33
 Baker, supra note 29, at 89. 
34
 Id.  
35
 Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042–43 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
36
 See Kerr, supra note 5, at 1216. 
37
 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1). 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. § 2703(a). 
42
 Id. § 2703(a)–(b). 
43
 Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
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storage.
44
  The first definition includes “any temporary, intermediate storage 
of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic 
transmission thereof.”45  The second definition of electronic storage 
includes “any storage of such communication by an electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such 
communication.”46  Neither the statute nor the legislative history provides a 
definition for the term “purposes of backup protection,” and, consequently, 
courts have struggled with its interpretation.
47
 
C. The Third-Party Records Doctrine and the SCA 
Scholarly defenses of the TPRD include arguments that the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment do not extend to property controlled 
by others,
48
 and that the doctrine is advantageous in the face of 
technological change because it is technology-neutral.
49
  Such justifications 
are insufficient, however, in a highly interconnected world where Congress 
has failed to create an adaptable standard for additional protection of 
content as technology advances. 
Sections A and B of this Part provide background on the SCA and 
discuss Congress’s purpose behind the Act.  Preserving the “privacy and 
security of communications transmitted by new noncommon carrier 
communications services or new forms of telecommunications and 
computer technology” was of paramount importance to Congress.50  
Congress was, for the time, technology-neutral in this language—it did not 
limit protections to electronic mail or computer-based bulletin boards; 
rather, it used these as examples to contrast with prior technologies such as 
the postal service or telephones.
51
  Congress noted that the content of 
communications was often the same,
52
 but that the protections afforded 
                                                     
44
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). 
45
 Id. § 2510(17)(A). 
46
 Id. § 2510(17)(B). 
47
 See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (noting the lack of definition for “purposes of 
backup protection”). 
48
 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561, 589 (2009) (“By knowingly disclosing information to a third party, an 
individual consents to another person having control over it.”). 
49
 See, e.g., id. at 579–81. 
50
 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559. 
51
 Id. 
52
 See id. (“American citizens and American businesses are using these new forms 
of technology in lieu of, or side-by-side with, first class mail and common carrier 
telephone services.” (emphasis added)). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 45  
identical content through different communications systems were vastly 
different.
53
 
This language is critical to understanding the role and purpose of 
the SCA as respects the TPRD.  Congress was not oblivious to the existence 
of the doctrine,
54
 and viewed the necessity of affording protections to such 
communications—whether in transit under ECPA, or in storage under the 
SCA—as critical in limiting the reach of the TPRD.  Nor did Congress 
intend this protection to be limited either to criminal investigations or to 
Federal jurisdiction—both the Senate Report55 and the final language of the 
statute itself support the intent that these be very broad protections. 
Why then did the SCA not achieve this goal?  As described in Part 
II of this Article, the failure lies in the final statutory language, which 
perhaps in an attempt to be technology-neutral, created ambiguity that was 
substantially technology-specific.  This language, drafted in the 1980s, 
failed to provide an easily adaptable framework.
56
  The result is a 
circumstance in which courts must interpret whether, and if so to what 
extent, users of a new technology enjoy Fourth Amendment-like privacy 
interests in the content of communications using modern technologies such 
as Facebook, Google, and Apple’s iPhone.  Such an outcome could be 
desirable if the underlying statute provided a framework clarifying what 
types of activities and interests Congress sought to protect. 
Unfortunately, as Part II of this Article suggests, the SCA provides 
anything but such a framework—leaving substantial ambiguity resulting in 
                                                     
53
 Id. at 5. 
54
 Id. at 3 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), for the proposition 
that records subject to control by a third party computer operator may be subject to 
no constitutional privacy protection).  
55
 See id. at 4 (noting the broad scope of the TPRD). 
56
 An alternative approach Congress might have employed, had it felt a technology-
neutral framework could not be drafted without leaving too much interpretive 
ambiguity to the courts, would have been to provide a technology-specific 
framework that would expressly require Congress, perhaps through sunset 
provisions, to revisit the framework as technology advanced.  This approach seems 
suboptimal, however, as a priori timing the sunset provisions to the development of 
new technology would be difficult.  Additionally, such provisions might risk 
political inaction overturning policy that otherwise would remain intact.  A third 
alternative, delegating the responsibility for updating these provisions to an 
administrative agency, might have facial appeal but could be more costly over the 
long term.  Additionally, such delegation could face challenges as the expertise 
required might span several agencies (e.g., the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, the Department of Justice, the Federal Communications Commission, 
etc.) and thus further increase costs.  Therefore, a technology-neutral approach 
embedded in statutory language likely was and likely remains the most appropriate 
option. 
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disparate judicial outcomes.  Nonetheless, while the 1986 language of the 
statute fails to provide clarity for modern-day technology, Congress’s 
original intent is clear—a desire to provide heightened protections for 
communications content in the face of advancing technology, specifically 
including limitations on the TPRD. 
D. Civil Discovery and the SCA 
For the practitioners slugging it out in the trenches, the SCA plays a 
significant role in civil litigation strategy.  While FRCP 45
57
 generally 
governs subpoenas in federal courts, and FRCP 26
58
 generally governs 
discovery requests in federal courts, the SCA specifically applies to 
subpoena requests issued to nonparties.
59
  As such, the SCA governs 
subpoena requests issued to Internet communications content holders, such 
as Yahoo!, Facebook, and Google. 
More and more, parties routinely seek discovery of communications 
shared and stored on social networking platforms.  Consequently, courts 
must not only grapple with the various state and federal procedure rules 
governing the discovery of electronically stored information, but also devise 
methods by which parties can obtain relevant social media content—such as 
status updates, private chats, and protected tweets—without violating 
established privacy protections.  While different courts have fashioned 
different methods
60
 to facilitate the exchange of such content between the 
parties, absent the SCA, courts would often face the privacy-offensive 
result of granting litigants’ requests to compel wholesale disclosure of 
communications content by nonparties because of the TPRD.
61
 
Yet, the SCA’s outdated language compels courts to engage in 
unnecessary statutory analyses to determine the extent to which particular 
communications are covered.
62
  For instance, in In re Jetblue Airways Corp. 
                                                     
57
 FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
58
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
59
 Rudolph J. Burshnic, Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil 
Discovery of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1277 (2012). 
60
 See, e.g., Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., No. 1:10-1789, 2011 WL 2491371, 
at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011) (conducting an in camera review of Plaintiff’s 
Facebook account to determine what content is discoverable); Gallion v. Gallion, 
No. FA114116955S, 2011 WL 4953451, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011) 
(ordering counsel for each party in a divorce proceeding to exchange their clients’ 
Facebook and dating website login credentials).  
61
 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp 2d 606, 609 (E.D. 
Va. 2008) (upholding a magistrate judge’s order quashing a subpoena seeking a 
nonparty’s e-mails from AOL because the SCA does not provide an exemption for 
such disclosure). 
62
 See infra Part II. 
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Privacy Litigation, a class of plaintiffs asserted, among other claims, that 
JetBlue violated ECPA “by divulging stored passenger communications 
without the passengers’ authorization or consent.”63  While JetBlue CEO 
David Neelman publicly acknowledged
64
 that the company had violated its 
own privacy policy by transferring its customer’s personal identifying 
information to a private data mining company, the New York district court 
nevertheless dismissed plaintiffs’ ECPA claims. Because JetBlue was acting 
as neither a provider of ECS nor RCS, the judge ruled, the SCA did not 
apply to the communications in question.
65
 
The Jetblue court principally relied on the holdings in Crowley v. 
CyberSource Corp. and Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP.
66
  In Crowley, a 
district court in California held that the “online merchant Amazon.com was 
not an electronic communication service provider despite the fact that it 
maintained a website and receives electronic communications containing 
personal information from its customers in connection with the purchase of 
goods.”67  In Andersen, the court “drew a distinction between companies 
that purchase Internet services and those that furnish such services as a 
business, and found that a company that purchases Internet services, such as 
e-mail, just like any other consumer, is not an electronic communication 
service provider within the meaning of the ECPA.”68 
As discussed above, in the context of discovery between the 
parties, the normal civil discovery process at least provides the parties 
opportunities to fully address the issue before disclosure—thus entrusting 
the issue of privacy protections to the adversarial system.
69
  Yet, in the 
                                                     
63
 In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
64
 Id. at 305. 
65
 Id. at 309–10. 
66
 Id. at 308 (citing Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001) and Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 
1998)). 
67
 Id. (citing Crowley, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1270). 
68
 Id. (citing Andersen, 991 F. Supp. at 1043). 
69
 It may also be the case that the adversarial civil discovery process provides 
insufficient protections; that question is outside the scope of this Article.  However, 
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context of disclosure requests served on nonparties, absent the SCA’s 
protections—in a world where nearly all communications are facilitated and 
stored by third parties—requests served on third parties would become a 
“backdoor” to the discovery process, taking it out of the hands of the normal 
civil litigation process.  Such a fundamental change to civil discovery 
procedures was not what Congress contemplated as evidenced by its 
enactment of the SCA and specifically the § 2702 confidentiality limitations 
on voluntary disclosure. 
II. INTERPRETIVE DIFFERENCES WITHIN SCA JURISPRUDENCE 
Courts across the country have embraced varying and often 
contradictory interpretations of the SCA’s language, especially when 
applying it to modern technology that did not exist at the time of the Act’s 
enactment. 
A. The Split: Whether Opened E-mails are Held in “Electronic 
Storage” 
Whether an ISP is acting as a provider of ECS or RCS with regard 
to a particular communication is a critical distinction due to the different 
privacy protections afforded to each type of provider.  This distinction is 
especially challenging to determine in the context of opened e-mails, and 
there is a genuine split as to whether opened e-mails are held in “electronic 
storage” for the purposes of the SCA.  The traditional approach, 
promulgated by the Department of Justice and embraced by most courts,
70
 
maintains that opened e-mails are not held in “electronic storage” because 
they are not backup copies of incidental wire or electronic communications 
held in temporary or intermediate storage.
71
  This interpretation assumes 
that the second definition of “electronic storage”—“any storage of such 
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of 
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backup protection of such communication”—contained in subsection (B) of 
§ 2510(17)) applies only to messages in subsection (A).
72
 
The Ninth Circuit in Theofel v. Farey-Jones rejected this reading of 
§ 2510(17), explaining that the phrase “such communication” in subsection 
(B) “does not, as a matter of grammar, reference attributes of the type of 
storage defined in subsection (A).”73  Therefore, the court analyzed whether 
the e-mails at issue fit the definition in either subsection (A) or subsection 
(B).  The court held that e-mail messages delivered to and retrieved by a 
user and stored by an ISP were stored for “purposes of backup 
protection”—falling squarely under subsection (B)—and were therefore 
protected under the ECS rules.
74
  The court reasoned that users frequently 
rely on e-mail servers to preserve e-mail messages in the event the user 
accidentally erases or misplaces the original messages, and concluded that 
“prior access is irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in 
electronic storage.”75  Under Theofel, “what matters is not whether the e-
mail has been accessed, but rather whether the e-mail ‘has expired in the 
normal course.’”76 
In United States v. Weaver, an Illinois district court attached 
significant weight to the particular e-mail system at issue in Theofel, noting 
that the Ninth Circuit relied “on the assumption that users download e-mails 
from an ISP’s server to their own computers.”77  In Weaver, the e-mail 
system at issue was a Hotmail account, which is “web-based” and 
“remote.”78  The Weaver court reasoned that communications stored on 
web-based e-mail systems are not stored for purposes of backup protection, 
but rather are maintained “solely for the purpose of providing storage or 
computer processing services,” and therefore must be governed by the RCS 
rules.
79
  But therein lies an important distinction.  The reasoning in Weaver 
assumes that the determination of whether an ISP is a provider of ECS or 
RCS turns on the ISP’s intentions, and not those of the user, with regard to 
the communication at issue.  The Weaver court states: 
[U]nless a Hotmail user varies from default use, the remote computing 
service is the only place he or she stores messages, and Microsoft is 
not storing that user’s opened messages for backup purposes.  Instead, 
Microsoft is maintaining the messages “solely for the purpose of 
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providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber 
or customer.”
80
 
The Weaver decision ultimately turned on the intentions of the ISP and not 
those of the user.  Yet, as the Ninth Circuit in Theofel noted, “nothing in the 
Act requires that the backup protection be for the benefit of the ISP rather 
than the user.”81 
The Weaver court further argued that the decision in Theofel cannot 
be squared with legislative history.
82
  For instance, the court cited a passage 
from the House Report on the SCA, which includes in part the following 
language: “Sometimes the addressee, having requested and received a 
message, chooses to leave it in storage on the service for re-access at a later 
time.  The Committee intends that . . . such communication should continue 
to be covered by section 2702(a)(2),” which governs RCS providers.83  But 
the Ninth Circuit addressed this point in Theofel and explained that the ECS 
rules would also apply, just as both the RCS and ECS rules govern already-
accessed e-mails: “If section 2702(a)(2) applies to e-mail even before 
access, the committee could not have been identifying an exclusive source 
of protection, since even the government concedes that unopened e-mail is 
protected by the electronic storage provisions.”84 
The ECS–RCS distinction can also be outcome-determinative in the 
context of civil liability.  In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., the 
attachment of civil liability turned on whether Arch Wireless, a private 
company that provided text-messaging pager services to the city of Ontario, 
was acting as a provider of ECS or RCS with regard to stored text 
messages.
85
  The district court held that Arch Wireless, acting as a provider 
of RCS, was permitted to release transcripts of private text messages under 
the exemption in § 2702(b)(3) because it had obtained consent from the 
city, which was a “subscriber” for the purposes of the statutory exemption.  
The determination that Arch Wireless was acting as a provider of RCS was 
critical because ECS providers are not exempt from liability for releasing 
such content even if they obtain permission from a subscriber.
86
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed and found that Arch Wireless was a 
provider of ECS.
87
  Interpreting the “plain language of the SCA, including 
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its common-sense definitions,” the Ninth Circuit argued that the definition 
of an ECS provider (“any service which provides to users thereof the ability 
to send or receive wire or electronic communications”) describes exactly the 
function Arch Wireless was contracted to provide.
88
  The court contrasted 
this function with that of an RCS provider, explaining that “before the 
advent of advanced computer processing programs such as Microsoft Excel, 
businesses had to farm out sophisticated processing to a service that would 
process the information.”89  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit relied on 
Theofel, writing, “Although it is not clear for whom Arch Wireless 
‘archived’ the text messages—presumably for the user or Arch Wireless 
itself—it is clear that the messages were archived for “backup protection,” 
just as they were in Theofel.”90 
The split deepened further in 2012 when the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina rejected the holding in Theofel and found that e-mail 
messages stored on a web-based e-mail system are not held in electronic 
storage.  In Jennings v. Jennings, the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
considered whether an individual, who, without authorization, accessed 
another user’s web-based Yahoo! Mail account and retrieved already-
accessed e-mails, was subject to civil liability under § 2701 of the SCA.
91
  
Lee Jennings initiated the lawsuit when he learned that his wife’s daughter-
in-law had correctly guessed the security questions associated with his 
Yahoo! Mail account and accessed his e-mails in order to obtain 
information about an alleged affair.
92
  The action turned on whether the e-
mails were held in electronic storage as defined by the SCA.  If the e-mails 
were found to fall outside the statute’s definition of electronic storage, then 
Jennings would be precluded from advancing a claim under § 2701.  
Specifically, the court considered whether the e-mails were stored for 
“purposes of backup protection.”93 
Previously, the South Carolina Court of Appeals applied, or perhaps 
extended, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Theofel to find that the e-mail 
messages maintained on the web-based e-mail system were held in 
electronic storage.
94
  The court first found that Yahoo! was acting as an 
ECS provider with regard to the e-mails at issue, specifically noting that 
Yahoo! “was providing email services to [Jennings] at the time the emails at 
issue were accessed.”95  The court next considered whether the e-mails at 
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issue were stored for purposes of backup protection, and found that “the 
previously opened e-mails were stored on Yahoo’s servers so that, if 
necessary, [Jennings] could access them again.”96  The court made express 
reference to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Theofel, writing: “Like the Ninth 
Circuit, we believe that one of the purposes of storing a backup copy of an 
email message on an ISP’s server after it has been opened is so that the 
message is available in the event that the user needs to retrieve it again.”97 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, rejected this 
interpretation, holding instead that the retention of an opened e-mail does 
not constitute storage for purposes of backup protection under the Act.
98
  
The Jennings court placed substantial weight on the dictionary definition of 
the word “backup,” which Merriam–Webster Dictionary defines as “one 
that serves as a substitute or support.”99  The court (incorrectly)100 
concluded that web-based e-mail systems maintain only a single copy of an 
e-mail message, and held that the e-mails were not maintained for purposes 
of backup protection.  Therefore, the e-mails were not held in electronic 
storage for purposes of the SCA.
101
 
Notably, South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Toal, while 
concurring in the result, explained that the exact definition of “backup” 
varies from dictionary to dictionary, and application of the definition 
proffered in the majority opinion (“backup” defined as “one that serves as a 
substitute or support”) may very well suggest that an e-mail message on an 
ISP’s server could be stored for support in the event that the user needs to 
retrieve it.
102
  Under this definition, the e-mail can be considered stored for 
purposes of backup protection despite whether or not there exists a second 
copy.
103
  Chief Justice Toal instead relied on the statutory and historical 
context of the phrase “backup protection,” writing that the “‘traditional 
interpretation’ of the [SCA], advanced by the Department of Justice, 
coupled with the fact that Congress never contemplated this new form of 
technology, provide a sounder basis to reach [a] decision.”104  This 
approach, however, places inordinate emphasis on the technology of 1986 
and does not afford due consideration to the privacy concerns at the heart of 
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the SCA, as evidenced by the legislative history.  Additionally, as discussed 
above in Part I, Section C, the Senate Report discussing the SCA suggests 
that Congress was not trying to “contemplate [a] new form of technology,” 
but rather was trying (if albeit unsuccessfully) to develop a technology-
neutral definition for affording protections to emerging technology. 
B. Social Media and the SCA 
Application of the SCA in the context of social media poses 
numerous practical and legal challenges.  For one, the scope of the SCA is 
limited to electronic communications “not intended to be available to the 
public.”105  Yet recent court decisions suggest that some communications 
made via social networking platforms may receive SCA protections, even if 
they were disclosed to hundreds or even thousands of third parties. 
1. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. 
 In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., a California district court 
considered whether the SCA applies to communications shared and stored 
on social networking platforms.
106
  The three social networking platforms at 
issue were Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple.
107
  In finding that all 
three sites provide private messaging or e-mail services, the court concluded 
that each platform is an ECS provider.
108
  The Crispin court further held 
that each social networking platform could also serve as an RCS 
provider.
109
  Specifically, the Crispin court wrote: 
As respects messages that have not yet been opened, those entities 
operate as ECS providers and the messages are in electronic storage 
because they fall within the definition of “temporary, intermediate 
storage” under § 2510(17)(A).  As respects messages that have been 
opened and retained by Crispin . . . [Facebook, MySpace, and Media 
Temple] operate as RCS providers providing storage services under § 
2702(a)(2).
110
 
Under this analysis, a social networking platform would be prohibited 
from voluntarily “divulging to any person or entity the contents of a 
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communication” made through an e-mail or private message, without first 
obtaining proper authorization.  Under the reasoning in Crispin, unopened 
private messages maintained for fewer than 180 days are governed by the 
ECS provisions, and social networking platforms may only disclose them if 
the government presents a valid warrant.  Opened private messages are 
governed by the less stringent RCS provisions: the government must 
provide notice to the user and need only present the social networking 
platform with a trial subpoena or court order in order to obtain them. 
The Crispin court embraced the reasoning in Weaver, finding that 
opened messages on social networking platforms should be governed by the 
RCS provisions.
111
  It also denied that its finding conflicted with Ninth 
Circuit precedent and instead insisted that its holding is supported by dicta 
in Theofel.
112
  Yet Theofel expressly states that “prior access is irrelevant to 
whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage.”113  If the Crispin 
court found (as it did) that Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple are 
providers of ECS, then it should not matter if the messages have been 
accessed by the recipient.
114
  Accordingly, the Crispin court quite clearly 
departed from Theofel in finding that Facebook, MySpace, and Media 
Temple are ECS providers but acted as RCS providers with regard to the 
opened messages, when Theofel found no such shift in ISP designation. 
The Crispin court also considered whether Facebook wall posts and 
MySpace comments are eligible to receive protection under the SCA.
115
  
First, the court analyzed whether wall posts and comments can be defined 
as being held in electronic storage.
116
  Applying the definition from 
subsection (A), the court found that wall postings and comments are not 
protectable as forms of temporary, intermediate storage because, unlike e-
mail, there is no step whereby comments or wall posts must be opened.
117
  
But the court, relying on a critically important analogy, found that wall 
posts and comments are stored for purposes of backup protection and are 
therefore covered by the definition from subsection (B).
118
  The court 
analogized wall posts and comments to messages on an electronic bulletin 
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board service (“BBS”)119—technology that not only existed in 1986, but 
also was expressly included in the legislative history.
120
 
2. Analogizing Wall Posts and Comments to Private BBS Messages  
The Senate Report on the SCA defines BBSs as “communications 
networks created by computer users for the transfer of information among 
computers,” and notes that “these may take the form of proprietary systems 
or they may be noncommercial systems operating among computer users 
who share special interests.”121  The Report acknowledges that BBSs made 
available to the public are not covered by the SCA, since facilitators of 
publicly-accessible bulletin boards effectively authorize anyone to access 
the communications.
122
  The statute reflects this in § 2511(2)(g): “It shall 
not be unlawful for any person . . . to intercept or access an electronic 
communication made through an electronic communication system that is 
configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to 
the general public.”123 
The Crispin court relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. to conclude that postings, once made, are 
stored for purposes of backup protection.
124
  In Konop, the Ninth Circuit 
considered whether an employer violated the SCA when he accessed 
without authorization a private BBS, which was maintained by Konop.
125
  
The Ninth Circuit expressly stated that the website was a provider of ECS 
and that the communications on the website were held in electronic storage.  
Importantly, the court considered the steps taken by Konop to restrict access 
to the public: 
Konop controlled access to his website by requiring visitors to log in 
with a user name and password.  He created a list of people, mostly 
pilots and other employees of Hawaiian, who were eligible to access 
the website . . . Konop programmed the website to allow access when 
a person entered the name of an eligible person, created a password, 
and clicked the “SUBMIT” button on the screen, indicating acceptance 
of the terms and conditions of use.  These terms and conditions 
prohibited any member of Hawaiian’s management from viewing the 
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website and prohibited users from disclosing the website’s contents to 
anyone else.
126
 
Following this reasoning, the Crispin court found that if a user 
sufficiently restricts access to communications displayed on his social 
media account, those communications may be covered by the SCA.
127
  
Specifically, the court stated that “the passive action of failing to delete a 
BBS post, which is in all material ways analogous to a Facebook wall 
posting or a MySpace comment, also results in that post being stored for 
backup purposes.”128  Accordingly, the court held that “Facebook and 
MySpace are ECS providers as respects wall postings and comments and 
that such communications are in electronic storage.”129  This finding would 
require the government to obtain a warrant in order to compel disclosure of 
sufficiently restricted wall posts and comments. 
But the Crispin court did not stop there: “In the alternative, the 
court holds that Facebook and MySpace are RCS providers as respects the 
wall postings and comments.”130  This alternative conclusion rests largely 
on the reasoning in Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.
131
  In 
Viacom, a New York district court determined that YouTube acted as a 
provider of RCS with regard to user-uploaded videos, which the user 
designated as private via YouTube’s privacy settings.132  The Crispin court 
analogized these restricted YouTube videos to restricted wall postings and 
comments, finding that in both instances, the webpages are storing content 
“for the benefit of the user and those the user designates.”133  The Crispin 
court’s reasoning is both conflicted and irresolute, and thus fails to clarify 
the SCA’s applicability to communications made via social networking 
platforms. 
This analysis provides support for our recommendations, discussed 
below in Part III, that the SCA suggests that Congress intended the scope of 
the TPRD to have limits respecting certain types of activities and content, 
such as communications.  Furthermore, this analysis supports our 
concurrence with Professor Kerr’s suggestion that ECPA and the SCA be 
amended to establish a single definition protecting all types of 
communication in-transit and in-storage with a single, equal standard of 
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protection requiring a warrant for access in most instances of criminal 
investigation. 
While it remains unclear whether communications shared and 
stored on social networking platforms should be governed by the ECS or 
RCS rules, the foregoing case law certainly suggests that certain social 
media users are entitled to some protection under the SCA.  In Crispin, the 
court considered whether the communicator put in place sufficient privacy 
restrictions.  This logic aligns with Congress’s explicit intent in enacting the 
SCA: to achieve a “fair balance between the privacy expectations of 
American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies.”134  
Moreover, well-established principles of statutory construction compel a 
reading of the SCA that “effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose 
of the legislative draftsmen.”135 
This Article suggests that Congress should amend the SCA to 
include already-accessed communications made via social networking 
platforms.
136
  Currently, the Crispin line of reasoning suggests the threshold 
question of whether wall posts and comments even fall under the SCA’s 
coverage at all hinges on the sufficiency of the user’s privacy settings.137  
Thus, we suggest that social networking platforms should have available 
privacy settings to restrict access in a manner sufficient for courts to 
analogize these platforms to private BBSs.  This approach raises at least two 
important questions.  First, to what extent must users restrict access to their 
profiles in order to enjoy the protections of the SCA?
138
  Second, are the 
available privacy settings sufficiently effective so as to make the platform 
inaccessible to the public? 
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3. Social Media Privacy Settings: How Private is Private? 
Because social networking platforms provide varying channels of 
communication, users will eventually and necessarily foster varying 
expectations of privacy with regard to each channel.  But the SCA does not 
afford protections according to reasonable expectations of privacy.  The Act 
instead compels application of language written for the technology of 1986.  
As a result, users can receive heightened protections for communications 
displayed to thousands of users, but lesser protections for private messages 
shared between only two people.
139
  The results of these interpretations may 
frustrate Congressional purpose as indicated in the Senate Report, thus 
suggesting that existing interpretation, which affords different levels of 
protection to different technologies, may be improper.
140
  Until Congress 
revisits the SCA, courts have options to address this distinction and afford 
more consistent levels of protection commensurate with Congress’s 
intent.
141
  The Crispin court’s conclusion that wall posts and comments can 
be analogized to BBSs relies on the assumption that the available privacy 
settings are even capable of being sufficiently restrictive.  Therefore, an 
assessment of privacy settings on social networking platforms is 
appropriate. 
A recent study published in the Carnegie Mellon Journal of Privacy 
and Confidentiality uses data from a longitudinal panel of 5,076 Facebook 
users to survey how their privacy and disclosure behavior changed between 
2005—the early days of the Facebook network—and 2011.142  The study 
highlights three contrasting trends: 
First, over time Facebook users in our dataset exhibited increasingly 
privacy-seeking behavior, progressively decreasing the amount of 
personal data shared publicly with unconnected profiles in the same 
network.  However, and second, changes implemented by Facebook 
near the end of the period of time under our observation arrested or in 
some cases inverted that trend.  Third, the amount and scope of 
personal information that Facebook users revealed privately to other 
connected profiles actually increased over time—and because of that, 
so did disclosures to “silent listeners” on the network: Facebook itself, 
third-party apps, and (indirectly) advertisers.
143
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For the purposes of this analysis, it is the third trend that sheds most 
light on the sufficiency of Facebook’s privacy settings.  The finding that 
disclosures users intended to be private were often revealed to third parties 
such as advertisers and apps, unbeknownst to the user, underscores the 
reality that privacy settings may not restrict content to the extent users—and 
courts—might assume.  For example, the study found that users often 
unwittingly reveal their birthday, location, photos, and the location of 
friends to third-party apps.
144
  More to the point, the study found that users 
often estimate incorrectly how many other Facebook members have access 
to their profile data: “social media users consistently underestimate their 
audience size for their posts, guessing that their audience is just 27% of its 
true size.”145  This speaks directly to whether Facebook’s privacy settings 
are sufficiently restrictive so as to equate wall posts to private BBS 
messages. 
A study published by the Department of Computer Science at 
Columbia University found similar results.
146
  The study investigated 
whether users’ Facebook privacy settings matched their sharing intentions 
and concluded that Facebook’s current approach to privacy settings is 
“fundamentally flawed.”147  Participants of the study completed intentions 
forms, which required the participants to indicate whether certain profile 
groups
148
 could access certain information categories.
149
  Participants were 
informed that the information categories were based on content rather than 
data type, and spanned all data types, including wall posts, photos, links, 
and status updates.
150
  The study found that every single one of the 65 
participants had at least one “sharing violation” based on their stated 
sharing intentions.
151
  In other words, “every participant was sharing 
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something they wished to hide, or was hiding something they wished to 
share.”152 
In addition, recent FTC consent orders concerning social 
networking platforms’ privacy settings further question the appropriateness 
of analogizing wall posts and comments to private BBS messages.  In 
November 2011, the FTC issued a consent order stemming from allegations 
that Facebook “deceived consumers by telling them they could keep their 
information on Facebook private, and then repeatedly allow[ed] it to be 
shared and made public.”153  For example, the FTC found that Facebook 
“told users they could restrict sharing of data to limited audiences—for 
example with ‘Friends Only,’” when “in fact, selecting ‘Friends Only’ did 
not prevent their information from being shared with third-party 
applications their friends used.”154 
Earlier that same year, the FTC took action involving the launch of 
another social media platform.  In March 2011, the FTC issued a consent 
order stemming from allegations that Google “used deceptive tactics and 
violated its own privacy promises when it launched its social network, 
Google Buzz.”155  The complaint alleged that Google made deceptive 
representations to consumers by suggesting that “consumers would be able 
to exercise control over what information would be made public through 
their Google public profile.”156  The FTC found that “the contacts with 
whom users emailed and chatted the most would become public by default 
and that user information submitted through other Google products would 
be automatically broadcast through Buzz.”157 
The foregoing studies and FTC consent orders suggest that privacy 
settings on social networking platforms may not provide the sort of 
restrictions that were present on private BBSs in 1986.
158
  For example, the 
Senate Report on the SCA states specifically that § 2701 “does not prevent 
broad authorizations to the general public to access such a facility.”159  
Specifically, the Report states: 
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The bill does not for example hinder the development or use of 
‘electronic bulletin boards’ or other similar services where the 
availability of information about the service, and the readily accessible 
nature of the service are widely known and the service does not require 
any special access code or warning to indicate that the information is 
private.
160
 
The Crispin court was quick to conclude that wall posts and comments 
can safely be analogized to a private BBS message provided the 
communicator of the wall posts and comments employed the available 
privacy settings.
161
  Yet this conclusion relies on the assumption that the 
available privacy settings on social networking platforms are sufficiently 
restrictive.  As the foregoing suggests, this assumption may not necessarily 
be appropriate.
162
 
III. AMENDING THE SCA 
Parts I and II present a historical, operational, and jurisprudential 
backdrop to the SCA.  Part III suggests that Congress should amend the 
SCA to provide heightened statutory protections for private electronic 
communications—such as private e-mails stored on Gmail and private 
messages saved on Facebook—where the user demonstrates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy by employing sufficiently restrictive privacy settings.  
Additionally, it suggests that even now, courts can (and some do) interpret 
existing language and Constitutional protections to afford protection more 
consistent with Congressional intent regarding private electronic 
communications.  
In 1976, the Supreme Court first recognized the TPRD in United 
States v. Miller.  Despite significant and substantial changes to 
communication methods, interests, and expectations, the Supreme Court has 
not revisited the TPRD.  Professor Kerr opines in a recent Article that 
“several lower courts have ruled that the Fourth Amendment fully protects 
the contents of emails held by third party providers.”163  He cites the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Warshak and points to several district 
court decisions that apply the Warshak reasoning to other forms of 
communications content, such as “Facebook messages, text messages, 
faxes, and password-protected websites.”164  In fact, Kerr concludes, “no 
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court has reached the contrary result.  Warshak has been adopted by every 
court that has squarely decided the question.”165 
Kerr concedes that the case law is not entirely settled: “only one 
federal court of appeals has squarely addressed the issue.”166  As the 
Supreme Court has yet to revisit the issue, Miller remains good law.  
Therefore, while Kerr is correct to characterize the developing case law as 
substantially supportive of Fourth Amendment protections for 
communications content stored by third parties, the issue is far from settled. 
An initial survey of recent federal decisions addressing related 
issues in the privacy and technology context suggest that some courts might 
be less inclined to follow the Warshak reasoning.  For example, the Fifth 
Circuit recently held that a mobile phone user does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in location data stored by a third-party mobile phone 
service provider—even if that data is necessary for the provision of the 
service.
167
  The Sixth Circuit held similarly in 2012,
168
 albeit in a ruling 
somewhat less clear on the technological distinctions differentiating it from 
United States v. Jones.
169
  Many of these decisions, notably including Jones, 
call upon Congress to remedy these ambiguities and construct clear 
guidelines in the privacy and technology context.
170
 
Congressional action may take time.  While a legislative remedy is 
the most appropriate resolution, in the interim courts still have options to 
preserve the level of privacy protections Congress sought to afford with the 
SCA.  This Article urges courts to follow the reasoning in Warshak and 
require law enforcement to obtain a warrant in order to compel disclosure of 
online communications content stored by third parties. 
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Civil litigation poses a separate problem given the natural absence 
of Fourth Amendment protection.  As discussed supra in Part I, Section D, 
this Article suggests that Congress intended for the SCA to create new 
protections responsive to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, which 
would prevent litigants from circumventing the discovery process.  Courts 
therefore should seek to limit discovery requests of communications content 
shared and stored on social networking platforms in light of the SCA’s 
legislative history. 
In The Next Generation Communication Privacy Act, Professor 
Kerr offers a thought experiment about “what might happen if Congress 
repealed ECPA in its entirety and enacted a new privacy statute to replace 
it.”171  Specifically, Professor Kerr suggests that this new privacy statute 
should (1) impose the same warrant requirement on access to all contents; 
(2) impose particularity requirements on the scope of disclosed metadata; 
(3) impose minimization and non-disclosure rules on all accessed content; 
and (4) impose a two-part territoriality regime with a mandatory rule 
structure for United States-based users and a permissive regime for users 
located abroad.
172
 
While this Article largely agrees with Professor Kerr’s proposals, it 
further suggests that Congress should adopt technology-neutral language in 
a manner that will clarify the content subject to protection while leaving 
sufficient flexibility for courts to apply the protections Congress intends to 
future technologies.  As discussed in Parts I and II of this Article, Congress 
attempted to do so with the SCA but failed in drafting.  The core challenge 
in this task is creating technology-neutral language that can encompass as-
yet-undefined future technologies.  Drafting such language is a plausible 
goal—by focusing on the protection sought to be afforded, rather than on 
the specific technology conveying the communication, Congress can 
achieve this goal.  This Article provides a modest suggestion for how, in 
adopting a single standard for criminal and civil protection of stored 
communications content, draft legislation might describe the bounds of that 
protection: 
Communications content stored on any interconnected information 
system permitting communications among one or more individuals 
where the system is configured or is configurable by individuals in 
a manner sufficient either to demonstrate an expectation of privacy 
or to allow those individuals the ability to demonstrate an 
expectation of privacy. 
The inclusion of language directed toward privacy settings reflects 
the central tenets of Katz and its progeny.  In Katz v. United States, the 
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Supreme Court held that a defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in telephone calls he made from a closeable public telephone 
booth.
173
  The Court articulated the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test, 
which requires a dual finding of a subjective expectation of privacy (on the 
part of the communicator) and an objective expectation of privacy (one that 
society finds as reasonable).
174
  The phone booth in Katz serves as an 
appropriate analogy to privacy settings because both contexts evince 
expectations of privacy.
175
  While the caller in Katz enjoyed Fourth 
Amendment protections inside the closeable telephone booth, the Katz 
opinion suggests that a similar level of protection would not have been 
available to a public phone not housed in a closeable booth.
176
  
As discussed in Part II, the privacy settings that allow users to 
express clear intent are important to drawing boundaries in complex 
information systems with both public and private components.  This 
concept is not new to the SCA.
177
  Likewise, it also has important roots in 
physical-world Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Privacy settings in social 
media and other advanced communications systems—when implemented 
and employed effectively—sufficiently demonstrate an expectation of 
privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.  Courts can take 
notice of these settings and societal expectations, similar to the cases like 
Katz discussed above, and implement the protections consistent with 
language like that proposed in this Part.  Congress should use such language 
to adopt a uniform standard to protect communications content shared and 
stored on social networking platforms where the user employs sufficiently 
restrictive privacy settings. 
CONCLUSION 
 Over the past decade, courts have embraced varying and often 
contradictory interpretations of the SCA when applying it to technology that 
did not exist at the time of the Act’s enactment.  As a result, seemingly 
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private electronic communications, such as e-mails stored on Gmail or 
private messages saved on Facebook, may not receive full privacy 
protections under the SCA, whereas semi-public wall posts could 
potentially trigger the Act’s highest protections.  In addition, there remains 
substantial uncertainty as to the efficacy of privacy settings on some of the 
most popular social networking platforms. 
Accordingly, this Article suggests Congress amend the SCA in 
order to ensure the Act achieves its original intent: providing universal 
privacy protections for private electronic communications regardless of 
whether those communications are in transit or in storage.  This Article 
further recommends Congress adopt technology-neutral statutory language 
to more effectively protect communications content now and in the future.  
This change not only better reflects the functionality of modern web-based 
e-mail and messaging systems, but also more accurately incorporates the 
drafters’ original intent.  The Article suggests language to help effect this 
goal, and also provides suggestions for how courts should act in the interim 
to preserve the additional protections Congress created with the SCA, which 
are directly responsive to the Supreme Court’s recognition of the TPRD in 
United States v. Miller. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
